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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH BEACH, : Case No. 20010445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State's argument that the confrontation between the police officers and Mr. 
Beach was mutually voluntary is unpersuasive. Three police officers stopped Mr. Beach 
by activating their emergency lights and calling him back as he walked away. R. 65 [12-
13]. They identified themselves as police and asked Mr. Beach to return to speak with 
them. R. 65 [13]. No reasonable person would have felt free to simply ignore them and 
walk away.1 This was a seizure requiring justification by reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.2 
The State argues that reasonable suspicion justified the seizure because Mr. 
Beach's activity had "the hallmarks of a drug deal." Appellee's Br. 14. This argument 
1
 See State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("When a reasonable 
person, based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with 
the officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs.5") 
(citation omitted). 
2
 See Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (reasonable, articulable suspicion must justify 
the seizure of a person). 
stretches the facts beyond the bursting point. Mr. Beach was merely speaking with people 
inside of a parked car, and he handed something to them or took something from them. 
R. 65 [9]. If this activity has all the hallmarks of a drug deal, then the police would be 
justified in seizing people for a disturbingly large number of mundane reasons, and the 
right of people to be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," U.S. Const, 
amend. IV, would be a nullity. 
Next, the State's argument that "numerous motor vehicle violations," Mr. Beach's 
"proximity to a 'drug house,'" and his "extreme nervousness," Appellee's Br. 13, 
justified the detainment is weak. There were no apparent motor vehicle violations at the 
time the stop was initiated. R. 65 [7-12]. Furthermore, even if there were, motor vehicle 
violations would have drawn the officers' attention to those in the car, not to a pedestrian 
standing nearby. Also, even though the police were on their way to case a possible drug 
house, R. 65 [5-6], Mr. Beach was not in front of the suspicious residence. R. 65 [17]. 
Furthermore, it is well-settled that nervousness does not justify detaining a person or 
prolonging his detainment.3 The State's arguments fail to establish that Mr. Beach's 
detainment was justified by reasonable suspicion. 
The State's argument that the stop was not illegally prolonged, Appellee's Br. 15-
17, is also unpersuasive. The police discovered almost immediately that Mr. Beach was 
3
 State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Lovegren. 829 
P.2d 155, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2 
involved in a car sale, not a drug sale,4 and the encounter should have ended at that point. 
However, the police persisted in questioning Mr. Beach, asking him three times for his 
consent to a personal search, R. 65 [22-28], and searching through his personal items. R. 
65 [22-27]. The State again points out that there were several traffic violations and the 
police were justified in prolonging the encounter to investigate the violations. Appellee's 
Br. 16-17. However, the record shows that this was not the officers' objective. R. 65 [25]. 
They focused exclusively on their goal of searching Mr. Beach for drugs, and did not end 
the encounter until they had done so. R. 65 [25, 28-29]. 
Finally, contrary to the State's arguments, Mr. Beach's ultimate consent to the 
search was neither voluntary nor attenuated from the illegal stop and detainment. The 
State's arguments that Officer Leavitt used no tricks, deception, or force to gain Mr. 
Beach's consent, and that Officer Leavitt told Mr. Beach he was not required to consent, 
Appellee's Br. 18-19, do not overcome the coerciveness pervading the encounter. The 
officers asked Mr. Beach a total of three times for permission to search, R. 65 [28], and 
they made it apparent that they would not leave until they had searched. Further, Mr. 
Beach's behavior strongly suggests that his consent was not voluntary. After hesitatingly 
granting consent, Mr. Beach attempted to avoid the search by showing the officers 
contraband. R. 65 [30-31]. This indicates that he preferred showing the contraband to 
4
 Mr. Beach told Officer Leavitt that he was selling the car to those seated inside. R. 65 
[14]. Mr. Beach produced sale paperwork. R. 65 [22]. Those in the car told the other two officers 
that they were going to test drive the car and were considering buying the car from Mr. Beach. 
R. 65 [20]. 
3 
submitting to a pat-down search, and coercion is strongly inferred. 
Finally, the State's argument that Mr. Beach's consent was attenuated from the 
illegal stop is unsupported. The State itself concedes that time did not attenuate the 
consent from the illegal stop, Appellee's Br. 19, and no other event dissipated the effects 
of the illegal stop. The same officers who conducted the illegal stop heard Mr. Beach's 
consent, R. 65 [28], the consent was heard in the same location and circumstances as the 
illegal stop, Id., and nothing interrupted the officers' persistent requests to search. R. 65 
[22-28]. The State argues, however, that Officer's Leavitt's comment that Mr. Beach was 
not required to consent provided attenuation. Appellee's Br. 20. However, case law 
supporting Mr. Beach's position abounds. State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 
1995), State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and State v. Matison. 875 P.2d 
584 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) all involve drug convictions which were reversed because the 
officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendants in the first place. In 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d at 652, State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d at 155, and State v. 
Ziegleman, 905 P.2d at 883 this Court held that evidence should be suppressed because 
the defendants were detained after the officers had effectuated the purposes of the stops. 
Under this precedent, Mr. Beach's conviction should be reversed and evidence 
discovered during the illegal detainment should be suppressed. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE OFFICERS9 
CONFRONTATION WITH MR. BEACH WAS VOLUNTARY. OR 
ALTERNATIVELY. SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION. IS 
FATALLY WEAK 
There is virtually no factual support for the State's argument that the three 
officers' confrontation with Mr. Beach was voluntary, or that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion to initiate a level two seizure. After observing Mr. Beach speak with two 
people seated in a parked car, R. 65 [9], and hand something to them or take something 
from them, R. 65 [9-10], the police stopped Mr. Beach by show of authority. They 
activated the emergency lights on their police car, all three emerged from the vehicle, and 
Officer Aaron Leavitt ["Officer Leavitt"] called to Mr. Beach as he walked away. R. 65 
[13, 19]. Officer Leavitt identified himself as a police officer and asked Mr. Beach to 
stop and return to speak with them. R. 65 [19]. Nothing about this sequence of events 
indicates that the confrontation was voluntary or supported by reasonable suspicion. 
Notwithstanding, the State argues that the confrontation was consensual because: 
1) Mr. Beach "immediately bolted" from the scene, apparently believing he had not been 
detained; 2) Mr. Beach was "well on his way down the street" before the police lights 
were activated; 3) Officer Leavitt "merely asked" Mr. Beach to return and converse; and 
4) Officer Leavitt did not display his weapon or touch Mr. Beach, he merely asked for 
Mr. Beach's identification. Appellee's Br. 9-10. 
None of these arguments are persuasive. First, Officer Leavitt did not testify that 
5 
Mr. Beach "immediately bolted" from the scene, he testified that Mr. Beach turned and 
walked away as the police car edged towards the side of the road. R. 65 [12, 19]. 
Furthermore, if it is presumed that Mr. Beach attempted to leave the scene because he 
saw the police car, this does not support the argument that his interaction with the police 
was voluntarily. It shows he was trying to avoid them. However, in a clear show of 
authority, the police activated their emergency lights and called him back. Mr. Beach was 
seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Second, it is irrelevant how far Mr. Beach had walked when the police activated 
their lights because the police immediately communicated that they meant to detain him. 
As Mr. Beach walked away, Officer Leavitt called out, identifying himself as a police 
officer and asking Mr. Beach to return and converse. R. 65 [19]. Mr. Beach returned. R. 
65 [19-20]. As argued earlier, the fact that Mr. Beach was walking away when the police 
activated their lights, emerged from the vehicle, and called to him to return, does not 
indicate that this encounter was consensual. It shows that this was a level two seizure. 
Third, the fact that Officer Leavitt phrased his words as a request, rather than an 
order, R. 65 [19], does not mitigate the officers' show of authority. The officers had 
turned their car, activated their lights, and all three had emerged from the vehicle. R. 65 
[19]. In these circumstances, an ordinary, reasonable person would not feel he was free to 
simply ignore Officer Leavitt's shouted request to return and converse.5 
5
 See State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("When a reasonable person, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of cooperation with the 
officer's investigation, but because he believes he is not free to leave a seizure occurs.") 
6 
Fourth, it was not necessary for Officer Leavitt to display his weapon or touch Mr. 
Beach to establish a level two seizure. Although the display of a weapon or use of 
physical force are factors relevant in determining whether there was a level two seizure, 
Trujillo. 739 P.2d at 87, other relevant considerations apply here. The use of emergency 
lights, the threatening presence of several officers, and the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled, Id.; State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996), are all relevant considerations which were 
present. As a whole, the circumstances indicate that this was a level two seizure which 
required justification by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.6 
The State argues that, even if the encounter constituted a seizure, the seizure was 
justified because "Officer Leavitt observed numerous indicia of illegal activity, including 
the hallmarks of a drug deal . . . ." Appellee's Br. 14. However, this is simply not true. If 
it were true, than a disturbing number of ordinary activities would carry the hallmarks of 
a drug deal. Showing baby photos to friends who pull over to converse, leaning into the 
window of a supervisor's new car to examine the interior, and handing copies of briefs to 
a law clerk who is about to leave for the day would all justify a police seizure. 
Fortunately, however, these activities are not enough to justify police intrusion into 
individual's personal security. If they were, the right of people to be "secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects" U.S. Const, amend. IV, would be a nullity. There 
6
 See State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, f 11, 999 P.2d 7 (To justify a level two seizure, a police 
officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal 
activity.) 
7 
must be reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify this level of police 
intrusion. State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987). 
The State argues, however, that Mr. Beach's seizure was justified because: 1) 
there were "numerous motor vehicle violations"; 2) the "proximity to a 'drug house.'"; 3) 
Mr. Beach's "hand-to-hand exchange"; 4) the fact that Mr. Beach began walking away 
when the police car turned; and 5) Mr. Beach's "extreme nervousness." Appellee's Br. 
13. None of these arguments are persuasive. 
The State misrepresents the significance of possible traffic infractions involving 
the parked vehicle. The record indicates that the officers stopped Mr. Beach because they 
saw him give something to or take something from those in the car, not because they 
observed a traffic infraction. R. 65 [7-12]. Further, it is not even clear that there was a 
traffic infraction. It does not appear to have been illegal for the cars to be parked at the 
side of the street, and Officer Leavitt did not issue a parking citation to anyone parked 
along the street.7 At any rate, even if there was a traffic infraction, the officers' attention 
would be drawn to those in the vehicle, not to a pedestrian standing nearby. At the time 
of the stop, Mr. Beach was not associated with any traffic infractions or even a vehicle. In 
fact, Officer Leavitt emphasized at least three times in his testimony that it was the 
7
 R. 65 [7-11, 29-30]. The State's inference that Mr. Beach was illegally blocking traffic, 
Appellee's Br. 11, is unsupported. Officer Leavitt testified that street where the car was parked is 
narrow. R. 65 [7]. It is so narrow that Officer Leavitt could not make a U-turn on the street, R. 
65 [12], and there is not even a center line on the street. R. 65 [8]. Apparently, any car parked to 
the side of the street would partially block traffic. R. 65 [7-8, 29-30]. "There [were] cars parked 
pretty much all the way along the lanes of the street on both sides," R. 65 [8], and Officer Leavitt 
had to slow to approximately five miles per hour to squeeze between the cars. R. 65 [10]. 
8 
"hand-to-hand exchange" which prompted the stop, not a traffic violation. R. 65 [9-12, 
18-19, 29]. Later in the detainment, the possibility of some traffic violations, such as 
driving on a suspended license and driving without license plates or registration, arose. R. 
65 [25]. However, these violations were not apparent to the officers at the time of the 
stop and did not motivate them to stop Mr. Beach. R. 65 [7-12]. 
Next, Mr. Beach's alleged "proximity to a 'drug house,9" Appellee's Br. 13, 
combined with the "hand-to-hand exchange," Id. does not indicate a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Mr. Beach was involved in a crime. Although Officer Leavitt 
indicated that he had information that a certain resident nearby may be trafficking in 
drugs, R. 65 [6], he had received no information about Mr. Beach or the parked car, and 
Mr. Beach was not in front of the suspicious residence. R. 65 [17]. Speaking with people 
in a parked car and handing them something, or receiving something from them, does not 
amount to reasonable suspicion simply because of a possible drug house nearby. 
Matheson Court House, the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Office, and the Salt Lake City 
Police Department have all been, at one time or another, within close proximity to an 
alleged drug house. Exchanging something with someone in a car at any of these 
locations does not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot. Whether the location is an office building, a public street, or a public park, only 
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifies a level-two seizure, and Mr. 
Beach's detainment was not justified. 
Mr. Beach's "attempt to leave the scene," and later his "extreme nervousness," 
9 
Appellee's Br. 13, are not relevant because they were not related to the officers' 
motivation for stopping him. The police stopped Mr. Beach because of the hand-to-hand 
exchange, not because he was walking away. R. 65 [9-12]. In fact, when Mr. Beach 
turned to walk away, Officer Leavitt had already turned the police vehicle towards him. 
R. 65 [12]. Further, it was not until after the police detained Mr. Beach that Mr. Beach 
displayed nervousness. 65 [12, 14]. At any rate, neither his walking away nor his 
nervousness justify a level two seizure because neither of these actions are extraordinary 
actions that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of crime. 
Finally, the State cites Provo City Corp. v. Spotts in support of its argument that 
the police were justified in detaining Mr. Beach. Appellee's Br. 14. In Spotts this Court 
found that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was in 
possession of a controlled substance. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437, 440 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). There, the officer had observed many distinct signs of marijuana 
usage, including: the defendant smoking a "joint," described as a one-half inch rolled 
cigarette which disintegrated rapidly as it burned; the defendant taking "hits" from the 
joint; the closed car windows on a warm day; the defendant's location in a vacant lot; and 
the odor of marijuana emanated from the defendant. Spotts. 861 P.2d at 438-40. 
In contrast, the police in this case observed nothing more than Mr. Beach speaking 
with people seated inside a parked car, and either handing them something or taking 
something from them. R. 65 [9]. Essentially, the police merely had a hunch that criminal 
activity was afoot. If anything, Spotts supports Mr. Beach's argument that the police 
10 
needed more to justify detaining him. As this Court observed in State v. Godina-Luna, 
even if an officer's hunch proves correct, "a hunch, without more, does not raise a 
reasonable articulable suspicion" necessary to justify seizure. State v. Godina-Luna, 826 
P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Therefore, the evidence discovered during Mr. 
Beach's detainment should have been suppressed. 
II. THE STATE'S ARGUMENT THAT THE OFFICERS' QUESTIONING 
WAS NOT BEYOND THE LEGAL SCOPE OF THE STOP IS 
CONTRADICTED BY THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
The State's argument that the officers' twenty-two minute questioning did not 
deviate from the legal scope of the stop overlooks the record, which shows that the 
officers persisted in following a hunch of illegal activity regardless of the ordinariness of 
the circumstances.8 The police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Beach in 
the first place.9 However, once they detained him, the detention should have ended as 
soon as the police discovered the nature of his interaction with those in the parked car.10 
Almost immediately, Mr. Beach explained that he was involved a car sale. R. 65 [14]. 
However, the officers paid scant attention to this and focused on their goal of searching 
8
 State v. KohL 2000 UT 35, f 11, 999 P.2d 7 ("While the required level of suspicion is 
lower than the standard required for probable cause to arrest, 'the same totality of facts and 
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific and articulable facts' 
to support reasonable suspicion.'") (citations omitted). 
9
 See Section I, arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. 
Beach. 
10
 See State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (The'°detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop . . . . ' " ) . 
11 
him. R. 65 [20-29]. Officer Leavitt did not speak with those in the car to learn the nature 
of their interaction with Mr. Beach, or ask the other officers, who had spoken with those 
in the car, for information. R. 65 [20]. Instead, he told Mr. Beach he was "gonna find . . . 
out" whether he was involved in criminal activity other than traffic violations, R. 65 [25], 
and persisted in questioning him and requesting his permission to search in spite of his 
obvious reluctance. R. 65 [22-29]. The police went beyond the legal scope of the stop in 
their questioning and in their persistent requests for permission to search. 
The State mistakenly characterizes the stop as multi-faceted, and argues that the 
police were justified in prolonging Mr. Beach's detainment to investigate possible traffic 
violations. However, as indicated above, the record belies that argument. The police 
focused almost exclusively on their goal of searching Mr. Beach for drugs. Id. In fact, 
contrary to the State's characterization of the facts, Appellee's Br. 16, possible traffic 
violations, including the lack of license plates or registration for the vehicle, did not 
become apparent until some time after Mr. Beach had explained that he was involved in a 
car sale. R. 65 [7-12]. At any rate, traffic violations were not of interest to the officers. 
They did not speak with Mr. Beach about the violations or cite him for them. R. 65 [25]. 
As Officer Leavitt testified, they were part of the drug interdiction squad and were 
focused on their search for drugs.11 However, the stop should have ended once the hand-
11
 Officer Leavitt testified that they asked for permission to search Mr. Beach: 
[d]ue to what we saw. We do that all the time, that's what we do. As a drug -
we're looking for drugs specifically on a lot of things. See hand-to-hand 
exchanges besides, besides his - that's our focus. But his behavior was -
12 
to-hand transaction was explained as a car sale. Because it did not end, the detainment 
went beyond the scope of the stop, and any evidence discovered as a result should be 
suppressed. 
III. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, MR. BEACH'S 
CONSENT TO BE SEARCHED WAS NOT VOLUNTARY BECAUSE THE 
STOP WAS FLAGRANTLY ILLEGAL AND MR. BEACH'S CONSENT 
WAS NOT ATTENUATED BY TIME OR ACT FROM THE STOP 
The State argues that Mr. Beach's consent to be searched was both voluntary and 
sufficiently attenuated from the effects of the prior illegal stop. Appellee's Br. 17-20. 
However, an examination of relevant case law shows that Mr. Beach's consent was not 
voluntary and was tainted by police exploitation of the illegal stop. The officers' baseless 
detention of Mr. Beach,12 the language they used as they persisted in requesting 
permission to search,13 their three separate requests to search, R. 65 [22-29], and the lack 
of any intervening circumstances, compel the conclusion that evidence resulting from the 
search is tainted. 
especially, it stood out. He was very anxious, nervous, rocking from side to side, 
putting his weight on - he was shaking, nervous, fidgeting. 
R. 65 [14]. 
12
 See Section I, arguing that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. 
Beach. 
13
 After Mr. Beach was asked for the second time to submit to a search, he asked whether 
he had done anything wrong. R. 65 [25]. Officer Leavitt responded "[w]e're gonna find that out. 
. . . " Id Officer Leavitt also asked him why he was nervous. R. 65 [27]. 
13 
A. The Record Demonstrates that a Sense of Coercion Pervaded the Entire 
Encounter, and Officer Leavitt's Sole Comment that Mr, Beach was not 
Required to Consent did not Render his Hesitant Consent Voluntary 
As the Utah Supreme Court established in State v. Thurman, a defendant's consent 
to an officer's request to search must be both voluntary and obtained without police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262-63 (Utah 
1993). Voluntariness is "primarily a factual question/' Id. at 1262, and centers upon 
"whether a defendant's consent was actually a product of his or her free will." Id. at 
1263. 
Here, the State argues that it established voluntariness14 because "Officer Leavitt 
made no claim of authority, used no tricks or deception and certainly used no force. He 
merely asked defendant if he would agree to be searched for drugs or weapons." 
Appellee's Br. 18. Further, Officer Leavitt told Mr. Beach "that the officers would not 
search him if he did not want them to." Appellee's Br. 19. 
This argument does not overcome the evidence of coercion that pervaded the 
encounter. During the twenty-two minute encounter, R. 65 [16], the police asked Mr. 
Beach total of three times for permission to search in spite of his obvious reluctance to 
consent. R. 65 [22-28]. In fact, they made it apparent that they would not release him 
until they had satisfied themselves about whether he had drugs. Furthermore, Mr. 
Beach's behavior after the third request strongly implies that his consent was not 
14
 See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 ("The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the 
defendant's consent was voluntary.") 
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willingly given. After the third request, Mr. Beach finally said, "go ahead [with the 
search]." R. 65 [28]. Officer Leavitt said, "You don't have to let us if you don't want to 
we won't" Id. Mr. Beach again said, "go ahead." Id. Before the police laid their hands on 
him, however, Mr. Beach veered away. He said, "I'm not going to lie to you guys, I have 
a little." R. 65 [30-31]. He reached into his change pocket and pulled out a baggy 
containing methamphetamine. R. 65 [31]. The police arrested him and took him to jail. R. 
65 [16]. 
This sequence demonstrates that Mr. Beach preferred showing the police 
contraband which would likely get him arrested rather than submitting to a pat-down 
search. Although he consented to the search, he quickly veered away from it by showing 
the police contraband. This strongly implies that his consent was not voluntary in-fact, 
and that Officer Leavitt's sole statement that Mr. Beach could chose not to be searched 
was insufficient to counter the coerciveness of the illegal twenty-two minute 
interrogation. Thus, the State has not shown voluntariness as required under the first part 
of the two-part Thurman test. 
B. Contrary to the State's Argument Officer Leavitt's Sole Comment that 
Mr, Beach was not Required to Consent did not Attenuate the Consent from 
the Illegal Stop Because the Effects of the Illegal Stop had not Dissipated 
The State has not shown that Mr. Beach's consent was attenuated from the effects 
of the illegal stop, as required under the second part of the Thurman test. "There are three 
factors to consider in determining whether the consent in this case was sufficiently 
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attenuated: (1) the 'purpose and flagrancy' of the stop, (2) the amount of time that had 
elapsed between the stop and the consent, and (3) the presence or absence of intervening 
circumstances.'" State v. Bello. 871 P.2d 584, 588 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Underlying this 
test is the constitutionally-based philosophy that the police must be deterred from using 
unlawful means to achieve their objectives.15 "Where 'the purpose of the misconduct was 
to achieve the consent, suppression of the resulting evidence clearly will have a deterrent 
effect.'" Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d at 293. In such a case "further analysis rarely will be 
required." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264. However, "'[i]n most cases, consideration of 
purpose and flagrancy will not end the exploitation inquiry.'" State v. Ziegleman. 905 
P.2d 883, 886 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (italics omitted) (citation omitted). The presence of 
intervening circumstances must be evaluated, Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264, and these 
"circumstances must be independent of the illegal police conduct." Bello. 871 P.2d at 
588. 
In this case, the stop was illegal from its inception. The police had nothing more 
than a hunch that Mr. Beach was involved in drug activity, R. 65 [7-12], and the purpose 
of the stop was to gain his consent to a search. R. 65 [22-28]. This was flagrantly illegal, 
and soundly qualifies for application of the deterred effect outlined in Thurman. 846 P.2d 
15
 See State v. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995) ("The purpose of an 
attenuation analysis is found in the basic truth that the government must use lawful means to 
achieve its objectives."); Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 ("The deterrence rationale . . . is grounded 
in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Illinois . . . . There, Justice Powell, in 
a concurring opinion joined by now Chief Justice Rehnquist, made it clear that the analysis used 
to invalidate consent on the basis of exploitation was grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes 
of the exclusionary rule.") 
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at 1264. Furthermore, neither time nor act attenuated Mr. Beach's hesitant consent from 
the illegality of the stop.16 As the State conceded, time did not attenuate the consent from 
the illegality of the stop. Appellee's Br. 19. Nor did an intervening event serve to 
dissipate the effects of the stop. In fact, the same officers who conducted the illegal stop 
heard Mr. Beach's consent, R. 65 [28], the consent was heard in the same location and 
circumstances as the illegal stop, Id. and nothing interrupted the officers' persistent 
requests to search during the stop. R. 65 [22-28]. In these circumstances, the consent was 
not attenuated. 
The State argues, however, that Mr. Beach's consent was attenuated because the 
circumstances were nonthreatening and congenial, and Officer Leavitt told Mr. Beach 
that he was not required to consent to a search. Appellee's Br. 19-20. In support the State 
cites a Wisconsin case and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
This argument is not persuasive or supported by the record, and the cited cases are 
not supportive of the State's argument. First, the record does not show that the 
circumstances were nonthreatening and congenial. No friendly banter was exchanged. 
The tone of the interaction was interrogatory. The interaction was, from beginning to end, 
a confrontational encounter wherein the police suspected Mr. Beach of engaging in a 
16
 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264 ('The nature and degree of the illegality will usually be 
inversely related to the effectiveness of time and intervening events to dissipate the presumed 
taint. Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean break in the chain of events 
between the misconduct and the consent to find the consent valid.") 
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drug transaction.17 When Mr. Beach asked whether he had done anything wrong, Officer 
Leavitt replied "[wje're gonna find that out " R. 65 [25]. 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court case cited by the State, Brown v. 
Illinois, is not supportive of its position. It is supportive of Mr. Beach's position. In that 
case, the Court held that confessions given by the defendant were inadmissible because 
less than two hours separated the confessions from the prior illegal arrest, which was a 
ruse used to facilitate the interrogation of the defendant. Brown, 422 U.S. at 604-05. The 
fact that Miranda warnings had been given prior to the confessions was insufficient to 
attenuate the confessions from the illegal arrest. Id. at 603-05. Brown, in general, stands 
for the holding that Miranda warnings "alone cannot always make the act sufficiently a 
product of free will to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection 
between the illegality and the confession." Id at 603. Thus, Brown supports Mr. Beach's 
argument one officer's sole statement, which does not even qualify as a Miranda 
warning, did not attenuate Mr. Beach's consent from the illegal stop. 
The Wisconsin case cited by the State is not controlling in our jurisdiction and is 
factually distinct. In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court admitted into evidence 
stolen goods found in the defendant's garage. State v. Anderson, 477 N.W.2d 277, 283 
(Wis. 1991). Police had seized some items from the garage under the authority of a faulty 
17
 R. 65 [19-20] (three officers confronted Mr. Beach and asked whether he lived in the 
area and what was he doing); Id at 21-22 (asked to search him to determine whether he had any 
drugs, weapons, needles); Id. at 24-25 (asked a second time to search); Id at 25-26 (took his 
Utah identification card and ran a warrants check); Id at 28 (asked a third time to search). 
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search warrant. Id. at 284. The next day, they took the defendant to the police station. Ld. 
at 279. There, the defendant admitted to stealing the items and referred police to some 
stolen items that they had overlooked in his garage. Id at 280. The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court ruled: 
the length of time between the illegal searches and the defendant's 
statement to the police is not clear, although it was overnight and at least 
seven hours. During that time, the defendant was at some taverns in 
Kenosha until he returned home at approximately 1:00 a.m. At 7:30 a.m. 
the police returned to the defendant's residence, awoke him, and then 
arrested him on an outstanding warrant for a traffic violation. The 
defendant testified that he took part in some humorous conversation with 
the detectives during the ride to the station . . . . Given the length of time 
and the nonthreatening conditions that existed between the illegal searches 
and the defendant's statement, we find that the temporal proximity factor of 
the Brown analysis leans toward a finding of attenuation. 
Id. at 282. Here, there was no such temporal or actual attenuation. The consent to search 
actually took place during the illegal stop, and there is nothing to indicate that the 
conditions were friendly and nonthreatening. Thus, the Wisconsin case is not on point. 
Utah cases provide ample guidelines for this case. For instance, in State v. 
Shoulderblade the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant's consent to have his 
vehicle searched was not sufficiently attenuated from the effects of an illegal roadblock. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 295. Police had conducted an illegal roadblock in Millard 
County, and had stopped the defendant and his companion. Id. at 291. The officers asked 
the defendant and his companion about their activities, and they indicated they had been 
to Las Vegas and were returning to Montana. IcL They replied negatively when asked 
whether they had alcohol, firearms, or drugs in the car. Id. The officers testified that the 
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"what [the defendant and his companion] were doing was 'entirely lawful.'" Id. The 
officers were given permission to search, and drugs, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and 
cash were found. Id. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "[bjecause the 
temporal proximity and apparent purpose of the traffic stop indicate exploitation of the 
illegal roadblock with no intervening circumstances, the consent to have the vehicle 
searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal roadblock." Id. 
at 295. 
Shoulderblade is controlling in this case. Here, Mr. Beach's seizure was illegal at 
its inception because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Mr. Beach's consent 
to search was not attenuated by either time or event from the illegal detainment, and was 
actually part of the detainment. As in Shoulderblade, the evidence discovered was the 
fruit of an illegal search, and cannot be used in evidence. 
Several other cases are on directly point. In State v. Godina-Luna, this Court 
affirmed the trial court's suppression of cocaine found in the defendant's possession. 
State v. Godina-Luna. 826 P.2d 652, 656 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In that case, a police 
officer stopped the defendant for drifting into improper lanes of traffic. Id. at 653. After 
stopping the defendant, the officer immediately recognized that the neither the defendant 
nor his companion were intoxicated. Id. However, he continued questioning and 
detaining the defendant. Id at 654. The defendant seemed nervous and, when asked 
whether he had drugs, alcohol, or weapons, invited the officer to search. Id The cocain 
found as a result was suppressed. Id at 656. This Court explained, "[t]he fact that 
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defendants were nervous does not raise a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity " 
Id at 655. There was no reasonable, articulable suspicion supporting the detainment after 
the officer recognized that the defendant and his companion were not intoxicated. Id 
"Nor were there any intervening circumstances separating the illegality from the 
consent." Id at 656. Significantly: 
Orozco's invitation to search was not of itself an intervening circumstance 
because the invitation came in response to a question posed in the midst of 
an ongoing illegal seizure. The deputy's question which prompted Orozco's 
invitation confirmed defendant's belief that because he was Mexican and 
did not have a driver's license, a search would be inevitable whether he 
consented or not. 
Id 
Likewise, here the police learned almost immediately that a car sale, rather than a 
drug deal, was in progress.18 Furthermore, Mr. Beach's nervousness did not provide 
reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging his detention.19 This stop was illegal not only 
because it was baseless at its inception, but also because it was needlessly prolonged. In 
these circumstances, Mr. Beach's hesitant consent to search, as the defendant's invitation 
to search in Godina-Luna, was not attenuated from the effects of the illegal stop. Officer 
Leavitt's sole statement that Mr. Beach did not have to consent to a search 
Mr. Beach told Officer Leavitt that he was selling the car to those seated inside. R. 65 
[14]. Mr. Beach produced sale paperwork. R. 65 [22-24]. Those in the car told the other two 
officers that they were going to test drive the car and were considering buying the car from Mr. 
Beach. R. 65 [20]. 
19
 See R. 65 [14]. (Officer Leavitt testifying that he prolonged questioning and 
detainment because Mr. Beach "was very anxious, nervous, rocking from side to side, putting his 
weight on - he was shaking, nervous, fidgeting.") 
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was not an intervening event and was emphatically inadequate to dissipate the effects of 
the illegal stop.20 Also, as in Godina-Luna, evidence eventually resulting from the stop 
should be suppressed to deter the officer from engaging in further illegal stops.21 
Support for Mr. Beach's position abounds. In State v. Lovegren this Court 
reversed a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
after finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. 
State v. Lovegren. 829 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This Court again 
emphasized that nervous conduct is as consistent with innocent as well as criminal 
behavior, Id. at 158, and that a mere hunch of criminal activity does not justify 
prolonging a detainment. Id at 159. In State v. Ziegleman, this Court reversed a 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Ziegleman, 
905 P.2d at 887. There, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding, but because the 
defendant appeared nervous, the officer prolonged the detainment by asking him whether 
he had weapons or narcotics. Id. at 884. Disapproving, this Court explained, "[although 
20
 The stop last for twenty-two minutes, R. 65 [16] and involved three requests for 
consent to search. R. 65 [22-28]. 
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 In Godina-Luna this Court noted "with concern" that: 
the record does not reveal how many unsuccessful searches [this officer] has 
conducted or how many innocent travelers [he] has detained. Common sense 
suggests that those numbers may be significant. As well as protecting alleged 
criminals who are wrongfully stopped or searched, the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution protects these innocent citizens as well.... In short, we cannot 
condone unconstitutional police conduct simply because it yields favorable 
results. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d at 655 n.2 (citations omitted). 
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defendant's consent [to a search'' was voluntary in fact, it was obtained through the 
exploitation of the trooper's illegal question of whether defendant had any narcotics or 
weapons in his car." Id at 887. Thus, the drugs found during the search were suppressed. 
Id 
In State v. Bello this Court reversed a conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance after finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the 
defendant when he veered into the wrong lane during extremely windy conditions. Bello, 
871 P.2d at 587. This Court found, "[w]ith respect to the temporal proximity factor, the 
record establishes that very little time passed between the [illegal] initial stop and the 
request for permission to search the vehicle." Id at 588. Further, "the fact that [the 
officer] smelled marijuana when he approached the car is not an intervening 
circumstance because the opportunity to smell the marijuana arose directly from the 
illegal stop." Id at 589. Likewise, in State v. Matison. this Court reversed a conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance after an officer stopped the defendant because 
the defendant had "fishtailed" some time earlier. State v. Matison. 875 P.2d 584, 587 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This Court noted that the defendant was stopped because "by mere 
happenstance, defendant was traveling in the same direction as Deputy Barney." Id The 
stop was illegal, and this Court remanded the case for findings on the issue of attenuation. 
Id at 589. 
Like the defendants in these cases, Mr. Beach was illegally stopped and there was 
no attenuation between the illegal stop and the consent to search. Officer Leavitt stopped 
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Mr. Beach on the basis of a mere hunch that criminal activity was afoot, and also because 
he happened to be speaking to some people in the street as the officers were on their way 
to case a possible drug house. R. 65 [6]. The illegal stop was then illegally prolonged on 
the basis that Mr. Beach was nervous. R. 65 [14]. However, as shown in State v. Godina-
Luna, State v. Lovegren, and State v. Ziegleman nervousness is not a basis for reasonable 
suspicion. Finally, Officer Leavitt's sole comment that Mr. Beach was not required to 
consent to a search did not attenuate Mr. Beach's consent from the illegal stop because it 
was apparent that Mr. Beach would be detained until a search was made.22 In these 
circumstances, evidence discovered as the fruit of the illegal detainment should be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, the State's arguments should be rejected and Mr. Beach's 
conviction should be reversed. This case should be remanded to the trial court with 
instructions to suppress evidence of controlled substances found in Mr. Beach's 
possession. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ,?& day of March, 2002. 
22
 R. 65 [22-28] (officers asked three times for consent to search); Id. at 16 (officers 
questioned him for a total of twenty-two minutes); Id. at 25 (informed him that they wanted to 
search him to "find out" what he was doing wrong). 
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